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condition precedent or more liberally designated as a promissory
warranty, it should, nevertheless, be properly construed as being
intended to be embraced within the meaning of the word "warranty" as found in the statute. Accord, Headen v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 206 N.C. 270, 173 S.E. 349 (1934); Schmidt v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 190 Minn. 239, 251 N.W. 683 (1933).
Contra, Fondi v. Boston Mutual Life Ins. Co., 224 Mass. 6, 112
N.E. 612 (1916); MetropolitanLife Ins. Co. v. Howle, 62 Ohio St.
204, 56 N.E. 908 (1900).
In four states, Iowa, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Wisconsin, statutes have been enacted which literally make the delivery
in good health clause a nullity if the insured was examined by
the company's doctor at the time of application. IOWA CODE ANN. §
511.31 (1946); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 511a (1954); S.D. CODE §
31.1507 (1939); WIS. STAT. § 209.07 (1953). These statutes are sign
posts indicating the present trend to deprive the insurance companies of their protection under the delivery in good health
clause.
The decision in the instant case has conclusively defeated the
purpose of the delivery in good health clause. Not even a limited
effectiveness remains as in most other jurisdictions. This decision
for all intents and purposes has written the epitaph of the delivery clause, at least in California. In its opinion the court made
no reference to the California "representation" statute, but based
its decision solely on public policy. It is submitted that, considering the present day economic situation, the decision is justifiable
on the theory that the insurance companies can better assume the
risk of an undiscovered illness than an innocent insured.
Ralph R. Blume

BOOK REVIEWS
THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY.

Eleventh Edi-

tion (revised). By Edward S. Corwin.- Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1954. Pp. xiv, 340. $5.00.
BiL. OF RIGHTS READER. Milton R. Konvitz2 (ed.). Ithaca, New

I Formerly McCormick Professor of Jurisprudence at Princeton University.
2 Professor in the New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University; Director of the Liberian Codification Project, A
Point Four undertaking.
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York: Cornell University Press, 1954. Pp. xix, 591. $6.50. Little
books on various phases of constitutional law abound. Many of
them make lively reading and at the same time prove to be useful
guides to an understanding of difficult portions of a highly complicated subject of investigation. Perhaps the most celebrated
series of these little books consists of those by Professor Corwin.
(He has, of course, contributed some big books too.) Professor
,Corwin's writings on constitutional law have been coming off
the press in abundant flow for longer than most of us can remember. The Constitutionand What It Means Today, however, while
-not a big book, is not restricted to a few special topics but is a
brief commentary on the entire Constitution of the United States.
The first edition was published in 1920. It has run to fourteen
printings including this latest, eleventh, edition. Decisions of the
;Supreme Court "approximately to the end of the 1953 term"3
have been taken into account in this edition.
As in the earlier editions, the author has in his comments followed the order of the Constitution itself, the text of which is
quoted from Preamble to Amendment XXH in convenient segments (sections or paragraphs, as the case may be) with explanations of cases and critical remarks thereon appended to the
appropriate segment of the Constitution that is quoted. The facts
and holdings stated in the text are supported by citations to decisions in the footnotes. Over 1000 cases are cited. Other materials
are cited also, such as the Congressional Record, law review
articles, and textbooks. The table of cases makes the commentary
on a decision readily available for reference purposes. The index,
however, does not list materials other than the cases in a systematic manner either by subject matter or author. Nevertheless the
book is a handy reference tool for an initial attack on any problem involving constitutional law.
But the book is far more than a mere reference work or index
book. It is not just a collection of quotations and citations conveniently arranged. The views of ilhe learned and judicious
author are expressed on almost every page in vivid and trenchant
prose. The reader's interest is stimulated throughout the book, so
that it is not only practicable but profitable to read the entire
volume from cover to cover without boredom. It must be con,ceded that this is an extraordinary achievement in a scholarly
work.
Many persons, including eminent judges, have professed the
belief that the Constitution means the same thing.today as it did
at its adoption except in so far as it has been formally amended.
Others maintain that the Constitution is what the judges say it is.
3 Text at

v (Corwin).
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What does the Constitution mean today? Corwin's book presumably is intended to supply an answer or, at the least, a partial
answer. The reader can find out what the Supreme Court has
determined with respect to the meaning of the Constitution. He
will see that the Court has read the Constitution in different
senses at different times. The Court itself has decided that it has
made mistakes in interpreting the Constitution. It would seem,
therefore, that the Constitution, under the Court's own theories,
may have some meaning independent of and different from what
the Court decides. Whatever theory the reader may prefer, however, it is clear that what the Court has decided with respect to
questions involving construction of the Constitution is the best
evidence for determining what the Constitution means today for
most practical purposes. It must be realized, on the other hand,
that there are many questions concerning the interpretation of
the Constitution that are not considered by the Court at all. Socalled "political questions" are examples.
Corwin's book should be made available not only to all lawyers
and students of law but to all citizens. All who can afford to buy
it should do so and keep it handy whenever such questions as the
adoption of the Bricker Amendment, segregation in the schools,
and other controversial constitutional issues are raised for consideration and possible action.
Dr. Konvitz's book may be fairly characterized as a casebook
designed for the general reader who is interested in American
decisions on human freedom. The edited text of the opinions in
some 73 cases is set forth with editorial notes preceding the
judicial pronouncements in each case. The cases selected are for
the most part those of the last twenty years. A few from earlier
years are to be found as well as a few from courts other than the
Supreme Court of the United States. But the great bulk of the
cases are the recent ones from that Court. Konvitz's book,
therefore, can be very profitably used in conjunction with Corwin's. Indeed, it would be advisable for the reader of Konvitz
to have Corwin's book at his elbow. An example of the interesting results of such a combination of Konvitz and Corwin will be
given presently.
First, however, it should be indicated that Konvitz uses "bill
of rights" in a broader sense than do, perhaps, most writers on
constitutional law. It will be recalled that in The Federalistthe
argument is made that the original Constitution prior to its
amendment contained a bill of rights. 4 In that view Konvitz in-

cludes such provisions of the original Constitution as those prohibiting bills of attainder and test oaths, within the bill of rights.
4 THE FEDERALIST No.

84 (Hamilton).
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And in addition to the first ten amendments he includes the Civil
War amendments and the Woman's Suff-age amendment.
The very first case set forth in Konvitz is the famous Steel
Seizure Case 5 of 1952. It constituteq his first exhibit under the
caption "The Rule of Law."8 Compare the high significance that
Konvitz seems to place on this case with what Corwin has to say
concerning the same case: "The lesson of the case, therefore, if it
has a lesson, is that escape from Presidential autocracy today is to
be sought along the legislative route rather than that of judicial
7
review."
Both books are recommended as valuable aids for the comprehension of important issues facing not only the stttdent of law
but all citizens today.
Roger Paul Peters*

THE ENGLISH CONFLICT oF LAws.

By Clive K. Schniithoff.1

Third Edition. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd. 1954. Pp. xliii,
514. The Conflict of Laws has indeed "ceased to be the Cinderella
of the common law,' as the author remarks in his preface. 2 Multiplying decisions now permit judicial statements to take the place
of conjecture and opinion. The accompanying compulsion to "codify" by statute has added to the "profound" changes which made
advisable a complete revision of this text published in its second
edition only six years ago. Within the limits of some five hundred
pages Dr. Schmitthoff succeeds in presenting clearly, concisely
and comprehensively the English conflict of law rules. We have
an admirable example of what a short text in an extremely difficult legal field can and should be. Although restricted to English
cases and statutes, American teachers, practitioners and students
will find it of the greatest value when re-examining both the
"solved" and the "unsolved" conflict of laws problems arising in
American courts.
Perhaps no field of law exercises greater fascinations on the
legal theorist than the Conflict of Laws. When Justice Story wrote
our first great text in 1834, paucity of precedent led him to wholesale borrowings from the rich continental inheritance of theoreti5 Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
6 Text at 5 (Konvitz).
7 Text at 128 (Corwin).
Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1 LLD. (Lond.), LLD. (Berl.), of Gray's Inn, Barrister-at-Law;
Lecturer in Legal Studies, the City of London College.
2 Text at v.
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cal speculation on "Private Inter-Rational Law." Even today the
nature of the subject is such that the approach to the solution of
its problems almost of necessity reveals one's own basic philosophy of law. Dr. Schmitthoff's text maintains a judicious balance
between the practical and the inevitable theoretical side of the
Conflict of Laws. His brilliant brevity and felicit: of expression
in restating the leading English cases give the welcome impression that here is no "paste pot and shears" compilation. There is,
on the other hand, nothing of the deadening blight of the apodictic horn-book "black letter," for there is just enough of the theoretical or philosophical to impart a sense that the cases and rules
discussed are alive. This is not to imply that the author lacks the
commendable courage to be definite, or, better still, definitive,
when the occasion arises. Unlike others fearful of the charge of
"conceptualism" and thus dodging or disclaiming definition, Dr.
Schmitthoff defines the Conflict of Laws at the outset of his work.3
Thus it will shock some to note that he "accepts" the "vested
rights" doctrine of Dicey and Beale and rejects the "local law" or
"local rights" theory of the late Walter Wheeler Cook.4 The difference between the two is "hardly substantial" from the "practical point of view."5 Nevertheless Dr. Schmitthoff has a "talent
for the jugular" in getting at the essential weakness of the Cook
doctrine:
The most serious objection to the local rights theory is, however,
that it is destructive without, at the same time, being constructive;
it denies the existence of a general principle justifying the solution
of an issue arising in the municipal courts by reference to a foreign
law rule. Those supporting the vested rights theory, on the other
hand, believe that such a principle exists, and that it is ultimately
founded on the idea that there exist human rights which should
be recognized and protected by the courts of all civilised countries
subject to the exigencies of municipal public policy. By proclaiming
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and by adopting the
Convention on Human Rights the United Nations have, made an
attempt to provide some degree of protection for such rights in the
international sphere; although in the municipal sphere these attempts cannot be called in aid of the argument in favor of the vested
rights theory it is believed that they are founded on the same
conception of justice from which the doctrine of vested rights arose
in the Anglo-American conflict of laws. 6

The vested rights doctrine is the "only" foundation of an "intelligible and coherent system of the conflict of laws."'7 The lead3 Id. at 6.
4 Id. at 33.
5 Id. at 34.
6
7

ibid.
Text at 16.
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ing English cases support it." Acceptance of it therefore gives Dr.
Schmitthoff's work unity and consistency. He is able to give a
completely lucid explanation of the difficult problems of "classification," "characterisation" and "connection" of the right.9 In the
past these problems have not often been fully explored by the
American cases. If, as is believed, their careful examination will
soon demand increased attention, the English experience with
them must be of importance to us. This experience is discussed
nowhere with greater clarity and conciseness than by the author
in his work. His entire third chapter is rewarding reading.
Dr. Schmitthoff diseusses renvoi in his treatment of the law
of domicile as the locus classicus of the problem.' 0 The comparatively few American cases on renvoi suggest the simple solution that the forum's reference to foreign law in a conflicts case
is a reference solely to the foreign "internal" or "domestic" law,
exclusive of its conflict of laws rules." This was the personal
view of Lord Russell as the author points out. 2 Dean Falcon3
bridge has strongly advocated this "short cut" or "short route"'
out of the "circulus inextricabiiis"in which as Maughan, J. remarked, the forum and the foreign court "bov to each other like
the officers at Fontenoy."' 4 Yet Rabel thinks this simple short
cut is but "the vanishing theoretical fashion of yesterday."' 5 Dr.
.Schmitthoff shows that the English rule is based on the "foreign
courts theory." When the English forum is referred by its choice
of law rules to -a foreign legal system it proceeds to "decide the
case as if [it] were sitting as the foreign court at the place of
domicile of the de cujus."' The English rule is said to be explicable on the basis of the English courts' "view on jurisdiction
and the vested right in general."'37 It is not "easy to apply," but
"ensures at least that the same law is applied to the issue in the
English court as, in the judgment of the English judge, is applied
by the competent foreign court."' 8 The author discusses "international understanding as a basis of simplifying the problems
8

Id. at 15.

Id. 35-54.
10 Id. 96.
9

l1 In re Tallmadge, 181 N.Y. Supp. 336 (1919); but cf. In re Schneider,
96 N. Y: Supp. 2d 652 (1950).
32 In re Annesley [1926] Ch. 709.
13 46 L.Q.R. 465 (1930); 47 L.QR. 271 (1931), (cited in Text at 96 n.).
14 In re Askew, Marjoribanks v. Askew, 2 Ch. 259 267 [1930] (cited in
Text at 97 n.)
35 In 4 Int. Law R. 402, 403 (1951).
16 Text at 97.
'7

Ibid.

3S

Text at 101.
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raised by renvoi,"'19 but insists upon adequate protection at all
events for what he calls "the most valuable feature of the English
conception of domicile"-the fact that it "has a uniform connota20
tion in all branches of the conflict of laws.
Review space permits only passing mention of the author's
practical treatment of the "choice of law" problem in the various
fields. Grouped in Division One are Contract and Torts; in Division Two, the Law of the Person, including Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage. Final chapters deal with Jurisdiction and the
Law of Procedure. The Armierican reader will find the chapters
on contracts and t6rts particularly stimulating in view of the
contrasted American rule[s]. Choice of law governing the essential validity of a contract has been called by an American
author "the most confused subject in the field of Conflict of
Laws."'21 The manner in which the English doctrine of the "proper
law," attributing a "particular position to the intention of the
parties" in determining the law which is to govern their contractual obligations has developed is carefully set forth by Dr.
Schmitthoff. 22 Reading this should enable one to gauge the soundness of Beale's long standing criticism of the English rule,23
deriving- from Mansfield's opinion in Robinson b. Bland.24 Dr.
Schmitthoff is aware, of course, of the root of the problem of
choice of law in the contract field-the old controversy between
the "subjective" and "objective" theory of contract itself. The
battle repeatedly won and lost in other fields must apparently
be fought anew in the conflict of laws area. The nature of the
battlefield can be ascertained from Dr. Schmitthoff's discussion
of the English cases which place a premium on the "intention
of the parties" eked out, as it were, by a variety of presumptions
when the parties express no intention at all.
Choice of law in the tort field as worked out in the English
cases may be profitably compared with the American rule. Dr.
Schmitthoff thinks that there-is no basis for the "obligatio" theory
in Phillips v. Eyre2 and that the English rule which requires
that the foreign tort must be "actionable" (or at least "unjustifi19

Id. at 102.

20

Ibid. Cf. remarks of Professor Cook, A-AERiCAN LAW INSTriTTE PRo-

cEEDINGS (1925) pp. 226-231.
21

GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (3d ed.) 321 (1949).

22

Text at 105-117.

23 "The doctrine was adopted bodily from the continental writers, and
is an anomaly in our law, though quite consistent with the principles of
the modern civil law." Beal, What Law Governs the Validity of a Contract,
23 Harv. L. R. 1, 7 (1909); 2 BEALE, CoN-FLIcT OF LAWS 1096 (1935).

2

25

2 Burr. 1077 (1760).

6 Q.B. 1, 30 (1870). Text at 152 n.
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able") at the place of its commission as well as "actionable" in
English law is the resultant compromise between the "lex loci
delicti" and "lex fori" theories.2 6 Behind the compromise is the
consideration that the "lex loci delicti" rule carried to its logical
conclusion would give foreign suitors preferential treatment over
suits basing their claims on torts committed within the jurisdiction of the forum. 27 In this connection the author discusses

briefly the "obligatio" theory of Holmes, 28 Cardozo 29 and Beale.30
He quotes Judge Learned Hand's rejection of the theory. 3 The
reviewer could wish that the author had developed his own
views on the matter since the quotation from Judge Hand is
based on the Judge's-own version of the "local law" theory and
Dr. Schmitthoff has previously rejected this theory as the basis
of Conflict of Laws. However, it is the author's submission that
the "obligation theory is not supported by the English authorities"
in any event.3 2 In passing it may be noted also that under the
English rule it is not yet clearly settled whether the foreign tort
must be3 "actionable" under the lex loci delicti or merely "unjusti3

fiable."

The Conflict of Laws will probably owe much in its future
development to Comparative Law. Whether we shall be helped
considerably by reference to the continental Conflict of Laws
is debatable. No legal Luther Burbank has yet appeared in our
midst with demonstrated capacity to graft on the solid trunk of
the common law cuttings or slicings from the alien civil law. This
being so, the American student of the Conflict of Laws will more
profitably turn to the body of conflicts rules developed in the
home of the common law. He will find in Dr. Scbmitthoff's small
volume a succinct and "easily understandable" explanation.
Edward F. Barrett*

26 Text at 152.
27

Text at 151.

In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (1924);
Slater v. Mexican Railway, 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
29 Loucks v. S*tandard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
30 1 BEAEJ, COzcT or LAWS, 66-67 (1935).
31 Text at 151-152 citing Guiness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769,770 (1923).
32 Text at 151.
28

33

Text at 153.

*Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School

BOOKS RECEIVED
Second Edition. By Anne Lyon Haight. New
York: R.R. Bowker Company, 1955. Pp. ni, 172. $2.50.
*BILL OF RIGHTS READER; Leading Constitutional Cases. By Milton
R. Konvitz. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1954. Pp. xi,
591. $6.50.
*CONSTITUTION & WHAT IT MEANS TODAY. Eleventh Edition. By
Edward S. Corwin. Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1954. Pp. v, 340. $5.00.
*THE ENGLISH CONFLICT OF LAWS. Third Edition. By Clive M.
Schmitthoff. London: Stevens & Sons Limited, 1954. Pp. xv,
514. $8.50.

BANNED BOOKS.

A Group of Addresses. By Hon. Harold
R. Medina. Edited by Maxine Boord Virtue. Albany: Matthew
Bender & Co., 1954. Pp. vi, 319. $5.00.

JUDGE MEDINA SPEAKS,

& GovE mmENT; THE SCHOOL SEGREGATION DECISION. By
James C. N. Paul. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1954. Pp. I1, 132. $2.00.

LAW

& NATURAL RIGHTS; Studies in Jurisprudence: H.
By Arthur L. Harding. Dallas: Southern Methodist University
Press, 1955. Pp. iv, 99. $3.00.

NATURAL LAW

NE~WmAN ON TRIALS. Second Edition. By Ralph A. Newman.

Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1955. Pp. xx, 600. $5.50.
A TREATISE ON LABOR LAW. By Morris D. Forkosch. Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1953. Pp. xxvIII, 1211. $10.00.
TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS; 1954 NACCA Convention Proceedings.

By Melvin M. Belli. San Francisco: Recorder-Sunset Press,
1955. Pp. xi, 459.
A UNIFORm SYSTEm OF CITATION: THE HARVARD CITATOR. Ninth

Edition. Cambridge: Gannett House, 1955. Pp. xv, 92. $.50.
THE U~ivEsrr TEACHING OF SOCIAL SCIENCES LAW. By Charles
Eisenmann. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954. Pp.
iI, 133. $1.00.

Reviewed in this issue.

